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Proprietary intellectuals
Andrew Ryder
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so 
many diff erent things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be the master 
— that’s all.’
Lewis Carroll
Words are ambiguous. Meanings vary according to context, and misunderstandings abound. Words and phrases might make sense 
individually, but combined in a sentence they can lose sense. However, 
communication relies on shared understanding, particularly in the 
academic world. Sharing and exchanging ideas is supposed to be central 
to the intellectual process, enhancing our ability to explain, decipher 
and understand. Traditionally, the formation of theories and models 
involved taking on board competing views, trying to convince those 
who disagreed that our views were correct. This process of persuasion 
often exposed fl aws in supposedly unassailable paradigms. As a result, 
advocates of particular models and theories and their opponents often 
modifi ed or even abandoned their proposals, and new, often radically 
diff erent ones replaced them. As Karl Popper put it, 
we can learn from our mistakes … The way knowledge progresses, 
and especially our scientifi c knowledge, is by … anticipations, by 
guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These 
conjectures are controlled by criticism; that is by attempted refutations, 
which include severely critical tests … Criticism of our conjectures 
is of vital importance: by bringing out our mistakes, it makes us 
understand the diffi  culties of the problem we are trying to solve. This 
is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to 
propose more mature solutions … As we learn from our mistakes, our 
knowledge grows. (Popper 1963: vii)
However, since the 1940s if not earlier, a new breed of academic has 
appeared, originally rooted in Marxism. Marxism depended not on 
observations or ‘facts’, but on the views of those who, in the words of 
Marx, ‘could see the line of march’. Their superior vision and insights 
privileged their views and interpretations above all others. Those who 
disagreed with them were wrong, regardless of the apparent wealth of 
evidence on their side. Hierarchy and hegemony dominated academic 
discussion rather than open academic discourse. To disagree with an 
avowed Marxist was to confi rm oneself an outsider and render one’s views 
irrelevant. I recall a conversation among students in which one criticised 
another’s views by saying, ‘You have not read Marx’s Grundrisse’. This was 
no diff erent from Soviet era eastern Europeans who paid lip service to 
Marx but interpreted him so as to support the latest party congress or 
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their own stilted views. The ultimate example was Lysenko, the Soviet 
biologist who insisted that genetics was a capitalist science and had no 
place in Communist society. Thanks to him, in the 1940s all the leading 
geneticists in the Soviet Union were put to death.
Marxism was widely discredited in the 1980s, but the struggle for 
intellectual hegemony has continued, often under the banner of post-
modernism and post-Marxism, but also in other guises. By virtue of 
superior insights, some intellectuals claim to be able to understand ideas 
and interpret the world better than their colleagues. Facts are subjective 
and ambiguous, and require interpretation by ‘experts’.
There is an analogy here with open-source versus proprietary software. 
The traditional academic model is an open-source one in which ideas 
are exchanged and enriched through competition and discussion. This 
resembles the process by which open-source software evolves. Open-
source software is often more robust, more fail-safe, and more user-
friendly than proprietary software. The post-Marxist academic model, 
however, is a proprietary one, where brand-wearing intellectuals act as 
gatekeepers and often as ‘owners’. These proprietary intellectuals — one 
might them microsoft intellectuals — propound theory, interpret facts, 
and promote doctrines. Proprietary software is opaque and unclear. It 
is almost impossible to alter, to improve, or to make more user-friendly 
unless the owner chooses to do so.
If an article or a book cannot be easily understood the fi rst time around, 
is it worth trying to read it again? Perhaps not. Often, it seems that 
obscure writing aims to inhibit, not promote, open discussion; to protect 
and insulate arguments and viewpoints from broader intellectual and 
academic debate rather than to advance knowledge. Obscurity is not 
profound, it is simply obscure. It does not lend authority or gravitas 
to pronouncements. Obscure meanings and the misuse of language 
inhibit communication and force people to work within a narrow 
frame of reference, just as proprietary software forces users to work in 
a technological straitjacket. Those leading the battle for intellectual 
hegemony rely on obscurantism and incomprehensibility for support. 
They implicitly argue that those who disagree with them are not merely 
wrong, but too stupid to understand their message. Their writing is often 
turgid, their meanings ambiguous, and their interpretations suspect.
Lewis Carroll, quoted above, thought that writers could be the masters 
of words, but only if the words were defi ned at the outset, and used 
throughout in the same meaning (Carroll 1998: 186, footnote 9). 
Ambiguity allows proprietary intellectuals to backtrack or revise their 
opinion without changing their words. Their excuse is that they need new 
terms to describe what purport to be new concepts. However, why create 
a new word or term if an old one will do? It is true that when writing for 
people in a particular fi eld, academics often use technical shorthand to 
describe things. For example, in economics, writers refer to the Harrod 
Domar model, or to the Kaldor–Hicks criterion. There is a diff erence, 
however, in using technical terms to refer to models and concepts which 
are widely known and understood (albeit sometimes only within their 
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fi eld), and in using terms which are always obscure, ambiguous and 
impossible to defi ne.
We like to think of intellectual life as being apolitical and open, but the rise 
of proprietary intellectuals shows that it is not. In many disciplines, such 
individuals are negligible, but in some, they have hijacked intellectual 
discourse. They constitute self-referential sects, promoting their world 
views and excluding others. They may alienate readers, but library 
subscription fees, conference grants, and other forms of inbreeding 
ensure their short-term survival. Like an academic Taliban, they claim the 
sole right to interpret the Koran or Bible, denouncing other interpretations 
as false and even blasphemous. Here we come full circle, back to those 
who can best see and interpret ‘the line of march’, rendering all other 
views irrelevant. However, although scholars often write in an academic 
context, we are not just writing for the ‘academy’ but also for a broader 
audience. This includes our students and the general public, people we 
want to reach out to, to infl uence, and to persuade.
Most people see the emperor’s new clothes, or lack of them, and ignore 
academic fundamentalists. Impenetrable writing alienates them, and 
in the process can render individual disciplines and sub-disciplines 
irrelevant to broader intellectual and policy debates. Unfortunately, in 
some countries and in some disciplines, proprietary intellectualism is 
encouraged. For example, in the United Kingdom, research output is 
not graded on the number of times a work is cited, or on the esteem in 
which a publication is held, but on the type of publication. Articles in 
so-called refereed journals are considered of higher quality than other 
types of publications, and some journals are considered more prestigious 
than others. Worse, the evaluation of output is left to a panel of so-called 
experts, self-appointed and self-renewing.
When proprietary intellectuals hijack entire fi elds, they stifl e innovation 
and change. Writing for an ever-decreasing circle of ‘expert’ adherents 
and their followers, they may win a battle but lose the war, ultimately 
threatening their academic and even intellectual survival. As their 
relevance disappears, many have gone further down the route 
of obscurity, creating new branches of pseudo-science with new 
terminologies and expressions to create more barriers to prevent 
outsiders coming in and to justify their roles as gatekeepers. They have 
justifi ed their attempts to balkanise their fi elds by invoking intellectual 
sources, such as Foucault, Derrida, Althusser, Baudrillard, Irigaray (quoted 
below — is it possible for a nuclear weapon to use an equation?), and 
others. Academic discussion becomes a debate about meanings and 
interpretations, a process of navel gazing and intellectual word-games, 
rather than a quest for the advancement of knowledge.
Is E = Mc2 a sexed equation? Perhaps it is. Let us make the hypothesis 
that it is insofar as it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that 
are vitally necessary to us. What seems to me to indicate the possibly 
sexed nature of the equation is not directly its uses by nuclear weapons, 
rather it is having privileged what goes the fastest. (Irigaray, 1987 taken 
from Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 100)
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The pervasiveness of this type of academic discourse may refl ect the 
fact that many intellectuals are uncomfortable without boundaries 
and restrictions. Just as the collapse of empires spawns new states, the 
gradual collapse of Marxism caused the fragmentation of many fi elds, 
spawning new divisions and new debates as many academics searched 
for what Sokal and Bricmont (1998: 178) called a new ‘argument from 
authority’. Perhaps the reason for the search can be understood in terms 
of the concept of anomie. Anomie is a sense of uncertainty caused by the 
collapse of social institutions which restrict choice and impose order in 
our lives. Over one hundred years ago, the sociologist Emile Durkheim 
(1897) argued that anomie led to an increase in suicides because large 
numbers of people could not live without boundaries. Perhaps many 
intellectuals like living in an intellectual straitjacket or an academic ghetto.
In some ways, this is also about geography: the geography of intellectual 
space, the creation of new borders, and the seizure of parts of the 
intellectual commons. This can be illustrated by an example from my 
current fi eld, geography. Since the nineteenth century, economic 
geographers have been interested in the factors underlying industrial 
location, the location of shops and services, and economic development 
in general. This work is widely used to locate shopping centres and stores, 
but from the 1970s onwards, it was denounced as ‘positivistic’ by a new 
breed of geographer. They claimed that it was simplistic, ‘privileged’ 
one type of data over another, was subjective, and mechanical. These 
geographers attempted to invent a new economic geography based 
on concepts borrowed from sociology. In the meantime, mainstream 
economists, including Krugman (1995), Venables and Fujita (1999) 
rediscovered the importance of space — that is, of geography — in 
economic aff airs. They mined the earlier work done by geographers, 
expanding on it and refi ning it. Far from welcoming this addition of new 
thinking, many geographers denounced this as a move to usurp their 
intellectual space. Similarly, in 1991, Greece denounced the use of the 
name Macedonia by the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as it moved 
towards independence. Due to Greek protests, it is still called ‘the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. However, as well as the independent 
nation of Luxembourg, there is a Belgian province of the same name.
Martin (1999) wrote that ‘it must be rare for a major new development 
in one discipline to defi ne itself by appropriating the label of another 
discipline. Yet that is precisely what is happening in economics … a so-
called “new economic geography” has emerged.’ He claimed that ‘the “new 
economic geography” is wholly at variance with the intellectual thrust of 
contemporary economic geography proper’, adding that its supporters 
‘make no reference to the work of economic geographers’. However, he 
admitted that what he called proper economic geography ‘lacks clarity 
and rigour, that fuzzy notions such as post-Fordism provide little incisive 
insight’, and fi nished by writing that
One litmus test, perhaps is whether and how far our work is taken 
seriously by and has an impact on policy makers. The ‘new economic 
geographers’ ’ … models have begun to attract the attention of key 
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policy organisations and governments … Not a single economic … 
geographer has been involved in these discussions.
The shallowness of many concepts becomes most apparent when 
one attempts to translate them into another language or explain their 
meaning to a broader audience. Even terms which seem relatively easy 
to understand, such as post-Fordism, lose their meaning when one starts 
to unpack them. For example, if Fordist methods of production are dead, 
then why are computer chips made the way they are, or chilled foods, 
or Levi jeans? True, some of these products are made overseas, but that 
does not mean production is post-Fordist. The assembly line method of 
production has spread, and the world is more Fordist than ever.
Obscure writing is an attempt to stifl e intellectual freedom, to balkanise 
the intellectual world, and to hijack disciplines. There are parallels with the 
democratic process. In the 1950s and 60s, Charles Lindblom (1965) wrote 
about what he called ‘the intelligence of democracy’. American democracy 
is traditionally based on discussion, compromise and consensus. Mirroring 
Popper’s statement, quoted earlier about how knowledge progresses, 
political scientists argued that policy making involves listening to 
and taking on board competing views, trying to convince those who 
disagree that policies are right. This process often exposes fl aws in 
proposed policies. When advocates of diff erent policies become aware 
of weaknesses in them, they change their views. Political scientists have 
suggested that although this slows down the decision-making process, 
it ensures that policies and decisions are more robust and more widely 
accepted.
Recently, many in the United States and elsewhere have expressed a 
post-liberal impatience with the democratic process, suggesting that this 
method of decision making is a barrier to direct action. This impatience 
is a defi ning characteristic of many political regimes. Leaders argue that 
they have access to the broader picture, and are therefore correct. Those 
who oppose them are wrong. This intolerance of debate characterises 
many proprietary intellectuals, as does the view that because of superior 
access to information and greater ability, they can somehow see ‘the line 
of march’. 
Who is to say what constitutes a given fi eld? What gives someone 
the authority to do so? If the ideas of proprietary intellectuals are as 
penetrating, original, and innovative as they claim, they should not need 
the protection of ambiguity, specialised vocabularies, and gatekeepers. 
Despite their claims to be revolutionary or forward looking, many 
proprietary intellectuals are backward-looking conservatives, who would 
use peer pressure to turn back the intellectual clock, to retard innovation 
and to control change. As Schumpeter put it, old views are ‘embedded in 
protecting relationships ... [They] may be losing ground for years without 
… [backers] becoming uneasy’ (1934: 241).
Ultimately, the success or failure of proprietary intellectuals depends on 
us, the broader intellectual and academic community. Many of us feel 
what Albert Hirschman (1971) called loyalty and a sense of belonging to 
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our disciplines. In that case, we can try to change our fi elds from within, 
exercising what Hirschman called voice, through publications, through 
conferences, through joining editorial boards, by engaging with our 
subject, and by speaking out against intellectual tyranny. However, to 
use Hirschman’s framework, we can also exit. When an academic fi eld is 
hijacked, it can be diffi  cult to change things from within. Writing about 
business innovation, the economist Schumpeter suggested that, 
The history of science is one great confi rmation of the fact that … 
thought turns again and again into the accustomed track even if it has 
become unsuitable … any deviating conduct by a member of a social 
group is condemned … Surmounting this opposition is always a special 
kind of task … (1934: 86–7)
We can migrate from our fi elds and rebrand ourselves. We can boycott 
journals which sponsor proprietary articles. We can reach out to 
alternative sources — which is crucial if we want to make our voices heard. 
In some countries, like the UK, this is more problematic than in others, but 
even UK academics can fi nd journals which are respected even though 
they do not publish jargon and double-talk. In addition, we can and 
should publish on the internet and through working papers.
On the one hand, we have a responsibility to remain open and impartial. 
On the other hand, we are under no obligation to walk around naked in 
the intellectual new clothes of academic bullies. It is time to demand clear 
writing, and to turn our backs on those who would try to balkanise and 
destroy the academic community.
References
Carroll, Lewis, Through the Looking Glass, Penguin Books, London, 1998 
(fi rst published 1865).
Durkheim, Emile, Suicide: A study in sociology, edited with an introduction 
by George Simpson, translated by John A. Spaulding and George 
Simpson, Free Press, New York, 1997 (fi rst published 1897).
Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, The Spatial 
Economy : Cities, regions, and international trade, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1999.
Hirschman, Albert Otto, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to decline in 
fi rms, organizations, and states, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1970.
Irigaray, Luce, ‘Sujet de la Science, Sujet sexé?’, in Sens et Place des 
Connaissances Dans la Société, pp. 95–121, Centre national de la 
Recherche Scientifi que, Paris, 1987.
Krugman, Paul R., Development, Geography, and Economic Theory, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
Lindblom, Charles E., The Intelligence of Democracy, Free Press, Collier-
Macmillan, New York, 1965.
PROPRIETARY 
INTELLECTUALS
THE FINE PRINT
Martin, Ron, ‘Editorial: The “New Economic Geography”: Challenge or 
Irrelevance?’, in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
New Series, Vol. 24, No. 4., 1999, pp. 387–91.
Popper, Karl, Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientifi c 
knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., translated from the 1926 German edition, 
The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1934.
Sokal, Alan D. Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern 
philosophers’ abuse of science, Profi le, Cambridge, 1998.
back next
PROPRIETARY 
INTELLECTUALS
